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In my presentation for the 2010 Meador Lectures on Rationality, I
chose to compare legal reasoning and scientific reasoning. Both law and
science pride themselves on the rationality of their intellectual methods and
believe that those methods are designed to analyze questions and reach the
correct conclusions by means of reason, free from cognitive or emotional
biases. Of course, both law and science often fall short of this ideal at all
levels, from the decisions about individual legal cases or scientific studies
to the acceptance of general theories. In many ways, the biases that mislead
legal and scientific thinkers are similar. But in other ways they are not.
Training to think like a lawyer is not quite like training to think like a
scientist, and, more important, the circumstances and constraints faced by
lawyers and scientists when they undertake the task of solving a problem
are quite different.
Another reason for comparing legal and scientific reasoning is a
practical one. Scientific evidence has become and is becoming increasingly
common in legal cases, and differences in legal and scientific reasoning are
a source of frustration to players in both disciplines.' Scientific "experts"
* Frank Murphy Distinguished University Professor of Law and Psychology. This paper has
been adapted from a lecture delivered as part of the Meador Lectures on Rationality at the University of
Alabama School of Law on November 1, 2010.
1. See Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law, 72
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are held in contempt as "hired guns" pushing junk science or as purveyors
of impenetrable jargon-ridden testimony that fails to address the question
before the court. The experts are frustrated by the seeming barriers to
telling "the whole truth" in the context of direct and cross examination.
Players on both sides agree that scientific testimony is less helpful than it
could be and often blame each other. Fundamental terms have different
meanings in the two disciplines: "evidence," "relevance," and "reliability."
The analogy of legal and scientific reasoning was devised and
consciously promoted by Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the
Harvard Law School from the 1870s until 1895. In his efforts to establish
law as a profession rather than a trade, he emphasized the idea that the
study of law is a science and that the law faculty, like the faculties of the
sciences, is a body of permanent scholars devoted to legal research.
We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the
proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all
that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and
physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the
botanical garden to the botanists.2
Just as the natural history museum is filled with drawers and jars
containing different species to be compared and contrasted with each other
and with newly discovered species, the law library would someday be filled
with volumes of different kinds of cases to be compared and contrasted
with each other and with newly decided cases. Langdell himself compiled
the first such volume in 1871, Selection of Cases in the Law of Contracts.
Langdell advocated a type of legal reasoning known as legal
formalism. Formalism bore a close resemblance to the biological
taxonomic system of Linnaeus, in which classes of plants and animals were
organized under phyla, the major divisions of animals or plants (e.g.,
arthropods); orders under classes (insects); families under orders (e.g.,
butterflies and moths); genera under families; and species under genera
(e.g., Monarch butterfly). Langdell's formalism followed the same plan: a
pyramid of rules with a very few fundamental "first principles" at the top,
such as the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, from which mid-level
and, finally, a very large number of specific rules could be derived (e.g.
2. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Address at the Quarter-Millennial Celebration of Harvard
University (Nov. 5, 1887), in 3 L.Q. REv. 118, 124 (1887) (emphasis added).
3. M. E. Bathurst, The Tutorial System: An Experiment in Legal Education, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV.
695, 695 (1940).
4. Curtis E. A. Karnow, Rhetoric ofAcademe, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 135, 137 (2006).
5. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983).
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five-person juries are unconstitutional.) 6 The legal scientist could move up
or down the pyramid. According to Grey, "the fundamental principles of
the common law were discerned by induction from cases; rules of law were
then derived from principles conceptually; and finally, cases were decided,
also conceptually, from rules."7 During the 18th and 19th centuries,
scientific and amateur explorers brought back an enormous number of
unknown plants and animals, which were closely compared with known
species that resembled them, and classified into their proper place in the
ruling order. For Langdell, new legal cases were like new species. The
method of classifying them by comparing them to existing cases was "the
case method," which revolutionized legal education and is still the legal
reasoning taught in first year law courses in order to train students to "think
like a lawyer."8
The zoologists and the botanists were a better analogy for Langdell
than the physicists and chemists, as taxonomy was still an important part of
what they did in the nineteenth century. Chemistry was not mainly
concerned with classification but with invention (e.g., dynamite) and new
theoretical formulations (e.g., the periodic law). Physicists also focused on
new theoretical formulations (e.g., the laws of thermodynamics), but they
did not study these by observing real-world phenomena like stoves or
treadmills; instead, they created special controlled conditions for studying
and measuring the phenomena that they wanted to understand. Even the
zoologists and the botanists did much more than merely wait for new
specimens to turn up. They cross-fertilized; they travelled to different
countries to see how similar species might be modified by different
environments; they interfered with the environments in order to see what
the effects would be.
Most of what the law does is to decide specific cases. Most of what
science does is not. Classifying new species was a bigger part of zoology
and botany in Langdell's time than it is today, but it was not the essence of
the science. The essence of the science was to identify underlying
processes that led to the differentiation of species. Most social sciences
(and if the law is a science at all, surely it must be a social science) are not
concerned with specific cases, except when they suggest an exception to a
general rule or assumption.
In this regard, the judge is more like the practicing physician or
psychiatrist, who is faced with a new patient and must decide on a
diagnosis, must make a classification. Psychiatrists use the Diagnostic and
6. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
7. Grey, supra note 5, at 19.
8. David D. Garner, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First Century,
2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 324 (2000).
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) to classify mental
disorders.9 There are higher-level categories, such as Anxiety Disorders,
Depression, Bipolar Disorders, and Schizophrenia.10 Under Anxiety
Disorders there are phobias, panic attacks, post-traumatic stress disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and others. They function somewhat like the
statutes that govern a judge's decisions, and the psychiatrist, like the judge
and the 19th century taxonomist, is also informed by the writings of other
professionals describing cases they have encountered and how and why
they decided them as they did. Like the judge, the psychiatrist is faced with
an individual case, a case that is unique but that resembles various other
cases that she and others have seen and sometimes described. As judges
must justify their decisions in terms of the law, psychiatrists, in
communicating their diagnoses to hospitals, insurance companies, and
sometimes courts, use the DSM to communicate and justify the patient's
diagnosis. As judges' decisions influence their sentencing
recommendations, so psychiatrists' diagnoses influence their
recommendations about appropriate treatment. Both legal and psychiatric
professionals use the case method. In general, I believe that because of this
shared interpretive framework the participation of practicing psychiatrists
and medical experts in the legal context has been easier than that of
scientists who do not deal with individual cases. The use of psychiatric
experts is not entirely successful, of course, because the law demands
distinctions that are often unimportant or meaningless to the psychiatrists:
either/or distinctions, such as sane or insane, intellectually disabled or
normal, competent or incompetent. Still, the practice of classifying
individual cases according to a set of rules is standard operating procedure
in both fields.
I. DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE (ANALOGICAL) REASONING
Scientific and legal reasoning are typically described as involving two
distinct methods: deductive and inductive reasoning. In science, deductive
reasoning involves the derivation of specific predictions from a general
theory or set of axioms. The general theory leads to more limited
hypotheses, and the hypotheses lead to specific predictions which can then
be tested by experimentation or observation. For example, a general
principle of the theory of evolution is that individuals that are well adapted
to their environment succeed by reproducing at greater rates. Based on this
general principle, a scientist may hypothesize that when the environment is
rapidly changing, evolution will progress at a faster rate. This hypothesis
9. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980).
10. Id. at 17-18.
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may in turn lead to the prediction that, although black moths far outnumber
white moths in the dark smoky environment of a mining town, if a major
effort is made to reduce the pollution and clear the air, white moths will
come to have an advantage and will soon outnumber the black moths. The
implementation of a major cleanup by the town provides an opportunity to
test this prediction."
Law generally begins with the specific case, and the judge looks to the
general law (statutes or precedents) from which the solution to this case
may be deduced. If a statute prohibits selling alcohol to anyone under the
age of twenty-one, and Joe's Liquor Store sells a six-pack of beer to
sixteen-year-old Richard, then it follows that Joe's Liquor Store is guilty.
We were all taught about deductive reasoning as "the scientific
method" in eighth grade, but in fact, it is fairly uncommon in science and
particularly in the social sciences. There are very few widely accepted
general theories, and the derivations may be questionable. So, for example,
there is a generally accepted principle that people tend to be attracted to
others who are similar to them. 12 But in practice there are thousands of
possible ways in which people may be similar or dissimilar. Do people like
people with the same hair color, size, political beliefs, personality traits, IQ,
neuroses, or what? Some derivations from this principle make sense-
intellectuals usually like intellectuals more than they like people who never
read-but some do not-do mean people like other mean people? Do
domineering people like other domineering people?13
In law, as in social science, the derivations from widely accepted
general principles may not be so clear. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution holds that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."l 4 History shows that the
deductions from this general principle change with time and customs: the
Equal Protection Clause did not require that blacks and whites be allowed
to sit in the same train car;" it prohibited racial segregation in schools; 16
pervasive but "unintentional" race discrimination is not a violation; 17 some
11. See Kenneth R. Miller, The Peppered Moth-An Update, EVOLUTION RESOURCES (Aug.
1999), http://www.millerandlevine.com/km/evol/Moths/mothshtml.
12. See DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 25-31 (1971).
13. See John E. Lydon et al., Interpersonal Similarity and the Social and Intellectual Dimensions
ofFirst Impressions, 6 SOc. COGNITION 269, 282-85 (1988).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
16. Brown v. Bd. of Edue. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
17. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 253 (1977);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 351-52 (1987).
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forms of affirmative action in education violate the clause, others do not.'8
In law, as in science, the meaning of the general principles changes over
time. In science, the general principle may be reworded; in constitutional
law, the wording stays the same but the accepted interpretation changes
over time. For example, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the
definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" changes as the values of
society develop and mature.1 9
In both law and science, the derivation of a particular prediction or
decision from the general law is often ambiguous: there may be more than
one general principle that is potentially applicable; there may be
ambiguities in the general principle; there may be more than one version of
the facts or their meaning. In law, attorneys for both sides may propose
different deductive arguments-identifying a law and showing how it
inevitably leads to an outcome that favors their client in the particular
case-but their aim is not to determine the truth but to create a chain of
reasoning that best favors their position. The decision maker gets the facts
from the attorneys, who emphasize different facts and often different legal
precedents. "[T]he law determines what facts are relevant while, at the
same time, the facts determine what law is relevant." 2 0 Thus, even the
apparently simplest form of legal reasoning-deciding whether a law
covers the facts of the case-is often quite complicated in practice. The sort
of deductive reasoning described to schoolchildren is seldom what
scientists or judges actually do.
Analogical reasoning involves the comparison of closely related cases
to the current case and the placement of the current case in the category of
those it most closely resembles, or, occasionally, the creation of a new
distinction that differentiates this case from all previous cases. It is
"bottom-up" rather than "top-down" reasoning. This is the heart of the case
method, introduced by Langdell. Langdell's original analogy to scientific
reasoning was that of a scientist identifying a new species, searching
through the drawers of the National History Museum to find the known
specimens that most resemble it and classifying it as a member of a known
18. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the University of
Michigan Law School had a compelling interest in promoting class diversity and that its "plus" system
did not amount to a quota system that would have been unconstitutional), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 279-80 (2003) (holding the University of Michigan's "predetermined point allocations"
system that awarded 20 points to underrepresented minorities "ensures that the diversity contributions
of applicants cannot be individually assessed" and was therefore unconstitutional).
19. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958) (holding it was unconstitutional for the
government to revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a punishment); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
20. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 141 (2d ed.
1995).
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species or a new, closely related species. 2 1 Although this still happens in
science, it is fairly rare. A more common form of analogical reasoning is to
compare a set of experiments that apparently have inconsistent results and
identify the variable that distinguishes those with result A from those with
result B. For example, sometimes people perform better when other people
are around, and sometimes they perform better when they are alone.
Numerous studies have provided evidence for both outcomes. In 1965,
Robert B. Zajonc explained this paradox by proposing that the presence of
others enhances performance on familiar, well-learned tasks (like a running
or swimming race) but impairs performance on novel tasks (like finding
one's way through a maze).2 2 The general principle is that arousal
facilitates the person's dominant response; when the dominant response is
the best one, performance improves; when it is not, performance suffers.23
In science, this sort of reasoning is reflected in the concepts of
24convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity means that
many different kinds of tests of the same concept or hypothesis all came
out the same way.2 5 So a researcher who has developed a measure of
aggression might show that her measure predicts shouting at people,
hurting them, slamming doors, spreading lies about them, and other
aggressive behavior. If only "shouting at people" were used as a criterion, a
critic could argue that it might be measuring impulsiveness or dominance,
not aggression. To demonstrate discriminant validity, the researcher tries to
show that the aggression measure is not correlated with measures of other
states, for example, impulsivity: e.g., it does not correlate with extravagant
26
shopping sprees, risky decisions, or ADHD. The term convergent validity
is also used when many different research studies using different methods
all produce results supporting the same hypothesis. The hypothesis that
jurors who favor capital punishment are more likely to find criminal
defendants guilty has been tested in surveys, laboratory simulations, and
post-trial interviews with actual jurors, using different populations over a
period of decades.2 7 The fact that across all these different methods pro-
capital-punishment respondents were more likely than other people to see
criminal defendants as guilty greatly increases our confidence that the
hypothesis is true, much more so than if all the studies had used the same
21. See Garner, supra note 8, at 319; supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
22. Robert B. Zajonc, Social Facilitation, 149 SC. 269, 270 (1965).
23. Id.
24. Donald T. Campbell & Donald W. Fiske, Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix, 56 PSYCHOL. BULL. 81, 81 (1959).
25. See id
26. See id
27. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical
Research on Capital Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE APPROACHES 177, 189-90 (Kenneth. C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988).
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method. Although the terms convergent and discriminant validity are not
used in the law, the case method is similar in that the judge or lawyer
attempts to define the meaning of a case by looking for factual and legal
similarities (convergence) and dissimilarities (discrimination) between this
case and related previous cases. This entails defining the universe of
possibly applicable cases and deciding which ones match the current case
most closely, and which, although apparently similar, do not apply.
II. BIASES AND HEURISTICS
Legal reasoning and scientific reasoning are also subject to errors and
biases, often the same errors and biases that affect the reasoning of ordinary
people.28
A. Hindsight Bias
Of all the cognitive heuristics and biases that have been studied,
hindsight is probably the one most familiar to the public. 2 9 Once people
know the outcome of an event, they believe that they would have predicted
it in advance. A study by Baruch Fischhoff once asked people to predict the
outcome of various current events, such as elections, before they happened,
and then asked them after the fact what they had predicted. People tended
to say that they had predicted the actual outcome, even when they hadn't.30
In science, this bias may show up as "HARKing"-Hypothesizing
After the Results are Known.3 1 Once the scientist sees the results of her
work, she comes to believe that they were exactly the results that she
predicted and reports them as though they were hypothesized in advance.
Sometimes this is done more-or-less strategically, to make it look as though
the author had engaged in wise deductive reasoning, but sometimes, the
scientists actually believes it was what she had thought all along.32
Hindsight bias can also occur when the scientist measures an outcome
with several different measures and only some of them show the predicted
effects. 3 For example, a researcher might test a program designed to
28. See REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 18-19 (2001).
29. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1124 (1974); see also Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased
Judgments ofPast Events After the Outcomes are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 311 (1990).
30. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight - Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288, 295-97 (1975).
31. Norbert L. Kerr, HARKing: Hypothesizing After the Results are Known, 2 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 196, 197 (1998).
32. See id. at 204.
33. See id
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improve academic motivation in schoolchildren and measure the outcome
by looking at hours spent on homework, extra credit assignments, help
from the teacher, and academic goals. If some of the measures show the
predicted effects and other do not, the researcher may "realize" that the
measures that didn't work were actually inappropriate measures of
motivation and so do not disconfirm the hypothesis after all. She may
explain away these inconsistent results when she writes up the research, or,
more reprehensibly, she may not mention them at all.
The risks of hindsight bias are especially prevalent in legal decision
making because, in deciding a case, the judge or jury always knows what
happened and what resulted. Their job is to assign blame. The tendency to
perceive that the outcome was predictable in advance may lead them to
believe that the defendant could or should have predicted it. Deciding
whether the defendant knowingly caused the damage or whether the
outcome was foreseeable in advance is often a crucial element in the choice
of a verdict, and hindsight bias suggests that judges and jurors are likely to
overestimate the ability to foresee an outcome.
B. Anchoring and Adjustment
When asked to make decisions in ambiguous contexts, people who are
given some value, even a completely arbitrary one or one that they know is
incorrect, nonetheless tend to latch onto that value and unwittingly use it as
an "anchor" in estimating the true value. "[P]eople adjust their estimates
from this anchor but nevertheless remain too close to it." 34 For example, if
people are asked whether the average annual temperature in New York City
is 700, most people will think that that number is too high. If they are asked
whether the average temperature is 40', most people will think that number
is too low. But when asked to guess the actual average annual temperature,
people will be influenced by the temperature they were given so that those
who heard that the temperature is 700 will estimate that New York is
warmer than those who heard that it is 400. The initial number, even though
people reject it, nonetheless serves as an anchor and biases their estimates
in that direction.
Economists often fail to predict major market changes because they are
anchored by the status quo; early polls often affect forecasters' predictions
of a candidate's ultimate success, and so on. In the legal context, a
plaintiffs original demand for damages may seem ridiculously high, but it
will nonetheless produce higher damage awards than a more reasonable
demand would have. Plausible anchor values influence decision makers
34. HASTIE & DAWES, supra note 28, at 99.
35. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 29, at 1128-29.
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more than ridiculously extreme values, but even extreme values still exert
some anchoring effect. Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack found that judges
who were asked whether a sentence of one year was reasonable gave
defendants shorter sentences than judges who were asked whether three
years was reasonable. 3 6 Jurors may be influenced by a prosecutor's demand
for the death penalty to believe that any prison term (e.g., a life sentence) is
lenient.
C. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek, believe, and remember
information that agrees with what we already think. There are of course
motivational reasons for this bias-we want to believe that we perceive the
world as it really is and that people who disagree with us are wrong. But
the cognitive bias is deeper than a need to preserve our self-esteem and
influences our thinking even in situations that are unrelated to our values or
our self-image. In a famous experiment, Wason and Johnson-Laird
presented participants with four cards, each showing a letter or number.38
E K 4 7
Each of the cards has a number on one side and a letter on the other,
and the participants were told that "if a card has a vowel on one side, then it
has an even number on the other side."3 9 Which of the cards would you
have to turn over in order to decide whether this is true? The most frequent
answer is "E and 4,40 and the next most frequent is "E" alone. Turning
over the E can confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis; turning over the 4
provides no information because the statement did not say "if a card has an
even number then the other side has a vowel." 4 1 But turning over the 7 is
essential, as the hypothesis would be disconfirmed if there was a vowel on
36. Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant
Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 192-93
(2006).
37. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
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the other side. Few people get this right; apparently testing for
disconfirming evidence does not come naturally to people.42
Nickerson has shown that this bias is pervasive in many real-life
domains, with people's hypotheses leading them to seek information that is
consistent, and ignore or minimize evidence that is inconsistent, with it.4 1
Rosenthal and Jacobsen told elementary school teachers at the beginning of
the school year that some of their students would excel that year.44 These
"promising" students were actually chosen at random by the researchers-
there was no evidence that they would do any better than the other students
in their classes. 45 At the end of the year, these students actually did perform
especially well.46 Apparently, the teachers' expectations translated into
their behavior towards the students and affected their evaluations of the
students' performances ,4 in a classic example of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. 4 8 Men who believe that the woman they are talking to on the
phone is attractive infer that she must also be charming and socially skilled
and in fact treat her in ways that bring out these qualities in her, compared
to men who believe that the woman is unattractive. 49 Racially prejudiced
people's prejudices are confirmed when they interact with minority
members, and they treat the minorities in ways that make them perform
badly.o
In the legal context, Barbara O'Brien gave participants a set of
materials resembling a police file in a criminal investigation of a home
invasion and shooting, including witness interview reports, ballistic
evidence, a photo lineup, a search warrant, and so on.51 After they had been
given the evidence collected in the first half of the file reporting on the
early stages of the investigation, half of them were asked to name their
prime suspect.52 In the materials some evidence pointed to Bill Briggs, who
had been fired by the victim several months earlier, and most of the
42. See id. at 173-74.
43. Nickerson, supra note 37, at 177-78.
44. Robert Rosenthal & Lenore F. Jacobson, Teacher Expectations for the Disadvantaged, 218
SCI. AM. 19, 19 (1968).
45. See id. at 19.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 22..
48. See generally Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REv. 193 (1948)
(discussing whether people's consequent behavior and some of the consequences of that behavior are
determined by the ascribed meaning).
49. Mark Snyder et al., Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling
Nature ofSocial Stereotypes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 660-61 (1977).
50. Carl O. Word et al., The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial
Interaction, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119 (1974).
51. Barbara O'Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract
Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 315, 319 (2009).
52. Id. at 320.
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participants named him.53 The other half were not asked to name anyone. 54
Then all participants read the second half of the file which included some
additional evidence consistent with Briggs's guilt, but also some evidence
that cast doubt on it, and some evidence that pointed to other possible
suspects. 55 Compared to participants who were not asked to name anyone,
participants who had named Briggs tended to remember more facts that
were consistent with Briggs's guilt, suggested new lines of investigation
focused on Briggs rather than on other possibilities, interpreted ambiguous
evidence as consistent with Briggs's guilt, requested more reports focused
on Briggs, and evaluated inconsistent evidence in a way that confirmed
their suspicions.5 6 O'Brien concluded that confirmation bias, in this case
confirmation of the guilt of an initial suspect, may be an important
contribution to false convictions. 7 In the legal context, this sort of bias has
been referred to as "tunnel vision."58
Scientists are certainly susceptible to confirmation bias. Many
empirical scientists in all fields design studies to test a single hypothesis,
which can lead them to focus only on the results that support that
hypothesis, or if none of the results support the hypothesis, to decide that
there was a problem with the method they used, not with the hypothesis.
Scientists and philosophers of science have, over the centuries, argued that
the right strategy is to seek methods or contexts that could disconfirm the
hypothesis59  or, better yet, to test multiple competing hypotheses
simultaneously, but our bias towards hypothesis confirmation makes it
difficult to put these recommendations into practice.co Like the participants
in O'Brien's research, the scientist attends to findings that confirm her
hypothesis, remembers them, explains away findings that do not, and
designs the next study so as to provide further confirmation. Doctors and
clinical psychologists are affected by their preconceptions and stereotypes
in diagnosing patients. O'Brien discusses the relation of her work to police
and prosecutors, 6 1 but other actors in the legal system, such as judges and
53. Id. at 319-20.
54. Id. at 320.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 328.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 292 (2006).
59. See generally KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Routledge 2002) (1935).
60. See T. C. Chamberlin, The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses, 15 SCI. 92 (1890),
reprinted in 148 SCi. 754, 754-55 (1965); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Richard Gonzales, Questions
and Comparisons: Methods of Research in Social Psychology, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 24 (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds., 2003).
61. O'Brien, supra note 51, at 318.
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jurors, are susceptible as well. Confirmation bias is a pervasive human
tendency.
In the courtroom, the use of the adversary system may provide some
protection against confirmation bias. The judge or the jury almost always
has to consider two competing hypotheses, one presented by the plaintiff or
prosecutor and the other by the defendant. The scientist often has a single
hypothesis and isn't forced to consider any alternatives, despite the
62recommendation of specialists in the scientific method. However, the
adversary system is by no means a complete protection against
confirmation bias. As Dan Simon has argued, the judge's initial uncertainty
eventually fades as he realizes how he will probably decide the case, and
the arguments that seemed to favor the other side dwindle into
insignificance due to pressures toward consistency and coherence. The
result is that most judicial outcomes are written as though there was never
any uncertainty; the decision was inevitable and the arguments for it
unequivocal. Jurors may be less confident in their decisions because they
often have to deal with arguments for different verdicts throughout the
decision-making process, and even when unanimity is achieved, not all
jurors may be equally confident of the correctness of the final verdict.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC REASONING
Despite their similarities, scientific reasoning and legal reasoning differ
in fundamental ways. They are bound by different rules, subject to different
constraints, and driven by different goals. These differences are not simply
a matter for abstract intellectual analysis; as scientific evidence has become
increasingly integral to legal decision making, the "deep tensions between
the goals and values of the scientific enterprise and the culture of the law,"
as Susan Haack put it, raise obstacles on the path towards truth and arouse
frustration in both experts and the legal decision makers.64
A. Lack of Opportunity for Empirical Testing
Perhaps the most important difference between scientific and legal
problem solving is that when the evidence is ambiguous, the natural
response of the scientist is to collect new data to illuminate the question.
Scientists are not constrained by the evidence at hand but can design and
carry out new observations or experiments to produce new evidence to
62. Campbell & Fiske, supra note 24, at 104.
63. Dan Simon, A Psychological Model ofJudicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 19-21
(1998); see also Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
64. Haack, supra note 1, at 2.
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address the ambiguities. This avenue is closed to judges. Judges must work
with the information presented to them in court, or in briefs, or both; in the
opinions of previous judges who have decided similar questions; in the law
itself, sometimes scholarly writings; and in, of course, their own common-
sense knowledge of the world. They can select from these sources and
interpret them in new ways, but they cannot create information that is not
already in the system.
Attorneys can create new information. Although the usual method is to
ask experts to testify about procedures they have already carried out or
studies they have already conducted, occasionally attorneys will work with
experts to conduct new research. For example, the expert may be asked to
conduct a survey in a community to find out whether the jury pool is
representative or whether in a highly publicized case a significant
proportion of the citizens in the community has formed strong opinions that
might impair their ability to judge the case fairly. Psychological or
linguistic experts may conduct research to determine whether a particular
set of judicial instructions is comprehensible to potential jurors6 5 or
whether a particular photo lineup is suggestive.66
Although the quality of this kind of research can be as high as that of
anything in the field, it is important to remember that the attorney's goal is
not to discover the truth but to win the case. If the results of the study he
has requested, however valid, do not contribute to the goal of winning, they
will not appear in court. If the expert objects that scientific truth demands
that they be presented, then the expert will not appear in court either. There
are always other experts, and the attorney has no obligation to choose the
best scientist or the most valid testimony. In fact, attorneys may argue that
they are ethically bound to use the expert whose testimony will most help
their client, regardless of the quality of the science.
B. The Need for Immediate, Final Decisions
Scientists have a great luxury and privilege that is not available to
judges: when the evidence is incomplete or ambiguous, they can say, "I
don't know." Scientists can create new information, and before they have
managed to do so, they can say, "No answer is possible at the present time.
We must wait for new information." Neither option is open to judges. They
cannot conduct new research to bring new evidence to bear on the case, and
they cannot say that there is not enough evidence to make a decision. Even
65. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising
and Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 230 (1996).
66. See Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness
Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 440-43 (1979); see also ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 150-51 (1979).
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when they feel that there is not enough evidence to make a confident
decision, they must make a decision anyway. In the process of making that
decision, their confidence increases, and they often forget that they were
ever uncertain.67 A scientist who ponders a problem and concludes that no
answer is possible at the present time may be admired; a judge who reached
such a conclusion would be considered incompetent: "Because the legal
system aspires to resolve disputes promptly, the scientific questions to
which it seeks answers will often be those for which all the evidence is not
yet in." 68
The modem era of empirical research in psychology and law was in
part stimulated by a Supreme Court decision that many in the social science
community considered premature.6 9 In 1970, in the case of Williams v.
Florida, the Court held that six-person juries, which were rare at the time,
were constitutionally permissible, citing "experiments" in support of its
claim that "the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to
be a function of its size." 70 It also claimed that jury representativeness
would not be compromised by the six-person jury because "in practice the
difference between the [twelve]-man and the six-man jury in terms of the
cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be
negligible."7 In 1972, this time citing a scant amount of research, the Court
decided that the requirement that juries reach unanimous verdicts was not
constitutionally required, as non-unanimous juries would deliberate as
thoroughly and would achieve the same level of certainty beyond a
reasonable doubt as juries that were required to reach unanimous verdicts.72
Members of the social science community were surprised and
dismayed that the Court could allow such significant changes in the jury
system on the basis of such flimsy evidence about human behavior.n These
decisions stimulated an explosion of research on juries. 74 However, the
Williams and Johnson decisions set precedents, and the new research,
showing that both smaller size and lack of a unanimity requirement did in
fact diminish the quality of jury decision making, appeared to be an
67. See Simon, supra note 63, at 92-94.
68. Haack, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis and internal citation omitted).
69. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology and Law, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 684, 685 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
70. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1970).
71. Id. at 102.
72. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360-63 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-
12(1972).
73. See Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernable" Differences: Empirical Research and
the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644-45 (1975); see also Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There
Were None: The Diminution ofthe Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 712-15 (1971).
74. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1983); see also
VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986).
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example of closing the barn door after the horse has already escaped. The
research was accurately discussed by Justice Blackmun in Ballew v.
Georgia (1978), when the Court held that five-person juries were
unconstitutional because they compromised the representativeness of the
jury, the quality of the deliberation, and the accuracy of the verdict.7 5 While
the social scientists may have been pleased to be so extensively cited, the
actual outcome of the case was not supported by the research record.
Almost all of the research compared six-person and twelve-person juries
and concluded that twelve-person juries were superior. No research
actually addressed the question of differences between five-person and six-
person juries,n and it is doubtful that any significant differences would be
found. Nonetheless, following Ballew, six-person juries are constitutional,
and five-person juries are not.78 From a scientific point of view, the obvious
conclusion would be that Williams should be overturned, but the force of
precedent, and the high value the law sets on finality, made that an
impossible outcome at the time.
Once in a while the Supreme Court has handed down a decision that
has acknowledged that the current evidence was insufficient to support a
constitutional claim but suggested that further research might provide more
decisive evidence that might be convincing. In Witherspoon v. Illinois
(1968), the appellant claimed that excluding all opponents of the death
penalty from jury service in capital cases resulted in harsher, more
conviction-prone juries, who would be biased toward guilty verdicts,
compared to juries drawn from a representative cross-section of the
population.79 The empirical record was thin, and the Court rightly decided
that it was "too tentative and fragmentary" to provide convincing evidence
of an unconstitutional bias in the procedure.80 However, in an
uncharacteristically scientific move, the majority appeared to acknowledge
that the question was an empirical one and that the decision could be
revised if additional research supported Witherspoon's claim. That this
reasoning was unusual for the Court is illustrated by the fact that when
abundant new supportive research was presented to the Court in 1986 in
Lockhart v. McCree, there, the Court (now with a very different
75. 435 U.S. 223, 231-39, 245 (1978).
76. Id. at 242-43.
77. Id. at 234.
78. Id at 239, 242.
79. 391 U.S. 510, 515-17 (1968).
80. See id. at 517-18.
81. Id. at 518 (stating that "[in light of the presently available information, we are not prepared
to announce aper se constitutional rule"); see also id at 520 n.18.
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composition) held that the practice was constitutional and stated that the
issue was not after all an empirical one.82
The law's need for immediate decisions also has consequences for the
quality of scientific evidence presented in the courtroom. When the
empirical evidence in support of an argument is weak, many of the most
qualified experts will refuse to testify or will insist upon providing truthful
testimony about the unreliability of the evidence, in which case the
attorney, having the best interests of the client in mind, will not use them.
However, not all "experts" are so scrupulous, and the attorney can often
find someone who is willing to testify to the truth of a proposition that is
generally rejected by the scientific community, scientists
from the farther ends of the spectrum of scientific opinion: those
ready to give a confident answer before others think any answer is
warranted, those more scientifically radical, or more scientifically
conservative, than most of their colleagues, those whose views
have become dogmatically entrenched in the course of their
involvement in the litigation process-and, no doubt, a few
outright cranks and a few outright whores.83
It might be argued that the adversarial process provides protection
against these disreputable experts: the other side can call in an expert to
refute the unscientific testimony. The Court in Frye v. United States8 4 held
that research evidence must be "generally accepted" by the relevant
scientific community in order to be admissible in court, and Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals85 held that acceptance is an important factor
for admissibility. But judges rarely have the education or knowledge to
assess the general level of acceptance of scientific information. The
plaintiffs expert will say that it is generally accepted; the defendant's will
say that it is not. And general acceptance can be redefined by redefining the
relevant field. Small specialized fields of practitioners outside of the
scientific community-such as handwriting analysts, advocates for some
forms of alternative medicine, and bite-mark analysts, to name a few-may
recognize "experts" in their field, but the whole field may be regarded as
suspect by the larger scientific community. For years courts relied on
"arson experts" to analyze the physical evidence in buildings that had been
burned down and provide expert testimony as to whether or not the fire was
the result of arson. Accumulated lore about patterns of cracked glass and
movements of the fire consistent with "accelerants" such as kerosene was
82. See 476 U.S. 162, 165, 172 (1986).
83. Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 (2008).
84. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
85. 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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widely accepted among this community of experts, but rigorous
comparisons of the residues of natural and arson-caused fires showed that
none of the supposedly diagnostic criteria actually distinguished between
them.86
Finally, in cases where the generally accepted scientific answer is
simply that "we don't know-there is not enough evidence," often neither
side will be interested in calling the expert because statements of
uncertainty are rarely likely to be persuasive. In the case of Barefoot v.
Estelle, even the Supreme Court was not persuaded by strong scientific
consensus that a question was unanswerable given the present state of
knowledge.87 In some states, one of the factors that jurors are supposed to
consider in deciding between the death penalty and life imprisonment is
whether the defendant is likely to be a danger to society in the future, to
continue to commit violent crimes.8 8 If their answer to this question is yes,
the death penalty is warranted. Some expert witnesses, such as the
notorious Dr. Grigson in Texas, could be counted on to testify in every case
that they had assessed the defendant and were perfectly confident that he
would definitely continue a life of violence no matter what the
circumstances.89 In Barefoot, the American Psychiatric Association filed an
amicus brief detailing the strong consensus among doctors and social
scientists that it was impossible to predict future dangerousness with any
accuracy and that it should not be permissible as an aggravating factor
because any evidence presented in court would be meaningless. 90 In fact,
the data indicated that predictions of future dangerousness were usually
wrong.91
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional for
juries to consider future dangerousness in deciding between life and death
and for experts to make predictions about the likelihood that the defendant
would pose a continuing threat to society. 92 The majority dismissed the
psychiatric evidence that such testimony was useless, saying that "[nleither
petitioner nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong
with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time." 93 The Justices
86. See TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE WILLINGHAM/WILLIS
INVESTIGATION 18-28 (2011), available at http://www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf; see
generally DAVID J. ICOVE & JOHN D. DEHANN, FORENSIC FIRE SCENE RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 2008)
(describing the need for the scientific method in fire scene investigations).
87. See 463 U.S. 880, 897-900 (1983).
88. See id. at 896.
89. See id. at 905 n. 11, 936-37; see also supra Haack, note 1, at 17.
90. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920.
91. See id ("The APA's best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong.").
92. Id. at 905-06.
93. Id. at 900 (emphasis added).
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seemed to reason that predicting the future violence of defendants is
sufficiently important for capital sentencing; if a legislature stipulates it, the
jury must be allowed to do it, even when the strong consensus among the
experts is that it cannot be done.
C. Categorical Thinking and Lack of Compromise
The need to reach final decisions in individual cases also encourages
categorical thinking: a defendant is either liable or not liable, sane or
insane, a danger to society or not. Scientists, especially social scientists, are
more likely to think in terms of continuous variables; there is always a grey
area between the sane and the insane, the dangerous and the safe, and the
deliberate or unintentional behavior. In dealing with people in these grey
areas, the task is to assess the individual and the circumstantial pressures
and to come up with an individually nuanced explanation, and if one is a
psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist or some other kind of counselor, an
individualized plan of treatment. But a judge has to make a decision, and
this has to be a categorical decision: liable or not liable; guilty or not guilty;
guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, or not
guilty; and so on. A judge can sometimes temper this stark decision by
leniency in setting damages or deciding sentences, but there are few formal
opportunities for compromise decisions.94
This general requirement of "either-or" decisions in deciding the
ultimate outcome of a case seeps into other evidentiary decisions, including
the presentation and interpretation of expert evidence. Experts in the field
may agree about most of the data, with disputes mainly about future
implications or secondary findings, but this comforting scientific consensus
is not likely to be apparent in court. The pressure towards categorical
thinking in the context of an adversarial system means that experts who
take unambiguous, often extreme, positions are favored, and even experts
who agree with other experts on most issues but differ at the edges are
encouraged to ignore the vast areas of agreement and to emphasize the
differences.95 An expert who wants to present an overview of the whole
question, emphasizing both areas of agreement and areas of disagreement,
may be stymied, because the attorney will only ask questions about the
disagreements. This is one reason that junk scientists are favored by
attorneys more often than they should be, and serious scientists are
frustrated and disillusioned by their attempts to provide useful evidence in
court.
The principle examples are plea bargains and pretrial settlements.





Daubert does not provide much protection against this problem
because judges deciding admissibility under Daubert also make yes-or-no
decisions about the validity of each expert's testimony. An expert who
agrees with an opposing expert except at the edges is likely to be seen as
having little to add. An expert whose research fails to address crucial
aspects of the question may be ruled inadmissible for that reason: her
testimony does not point to an unequivocal yes-or-no answer. Or a judge
may reject an expert because of some imperfection in the research. But in
science, certainty is often achieved by examining a coalescence of many
studies, using many methods, each with different flaws and different
strengths, so that one's methodological strengths compensate for the
methodological weaknesses of others, ultimately producing a "convergent
validity" that is stronger than the validity of any single study.96 By making
a categorical "either-or" decision on each expert witness's contribution, a
strong consensus among experts about the ultimate conclusion may be
overlooked.9 7
This piecemeal, categorical decision making is also evident at the
appellate level. In the case of Lockhart v. McCree, the question of whether
juries made up exclusively of people who would be willing to sentence a
person to death would be biased against defendants in deciding guilt came
before the Supreme Court.9 8 The Court had rejected this claim in 1968 in
Witherspoon because the empirical evidence for a bias toward guilt was too
tentative and fragmentary. 99 By 1986 when Lockhart was decided, the
evidence consisted of fifteen empirical studies, conducted over a thirty-year
period, using samples from different geographic areas and different
demographic groups, and multiple methods: surveys, experiments,
simulations, and observations of actual jurors. All of the research
converged on the conclusion that death-qualified jurors were more
favorable to the prosecution and were more likely to vote guilty than the
citizens who were excluded, and jury deliberation did not erase the bias.'00
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, examined the fifteen studies
one by one, finding a flaw in each and discarding it from the set, until only
one was left,' 0 and "[s]urely" he concluded, a constitutional decision
"should not be based on . .. [a] lone study . . . ."'02 Although the American
Psychological Association's amicus brief, the lower court cases, and Justice
96. See Campbell & Fiske, supra note 24, at 81.
97. Haack, supra note 83, at 1003-04.
98. See 476 U.S. 162, 184-85 (1986).
99. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968).
100. See Ellsworth, supra note 27, at 189-91.
101. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168-72.
102. Id. at 172-73.
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Marshall's dissent clearly described the concept of convergent validity,0 3
the Court majority managed to overlook it, instead making a categorical
"valid or invalid" decision about each study on different grounds.
D. Individualized Decisions vs. Probabilistic Reasoning,
and the Dispositional Bias
In the social sciences, reasoning and evidence are usually probabilistic.
For example, researchers may examine hundreds or thousands of cases to
discover whether racial or gender discrimination exists in a company,104 Or
an organization, or a procedure such as jury selection, 0 5 or capital
sentencingl 06 to find that women or African Americans or some other group
are hired less often, chosen for the jury venire less often, or sentenced to
death more often than white men. This is not the question a judge is trying
to answer, though the evidence may be relevant. The judge wants to know
whether this particular woman or African American was discriminated
against because of gender or race in this particular case. This is not a
question scientists know how to answer.'07 As mentioned earlier, this is one
reason that psychiatrists, like other doctors, have had an easier experience
as expert witnesses than research social scientists or epidemiologists. Their
question- "what is the nature of this person?"-is the same as the law's
question, and one of the most pervasive (and least visible) uses of social
science expertise in the legal system is the evaluation of the "fitness,
dangerousness, sanity, truthfulness, or emotional well-being of
individuals."' 08 Aggregate and probabilistic data showing a systematic
pattern of racial discrimination, or a risk factor for disease (smoking), or
the lack of one (Bendectin) are suspect because they cannot tell us whether
race, or smoking, or Bendectin was definitely the cause of this particular
person's misfortune.1 09
The courts have become more receptive to aggregate statistical data
over the past half-century. Data of this kind figure regularly in employment
103. See id. at 186-88.
104. See Word et al., supra note 50, at 119; Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and
Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357-58 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1998).
105. See generally Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977) (holding that Castenada
made out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by presenting census statistics that showed the
grand jury selection list had a disproportionately low number of Mexican-Americans).
106. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 312-14 (1990); see also Ellsworth & Mauro, supra note 69, at 719.
107. Haack, supra note 83, at 985-87.
108. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision Making, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 581, 588 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986).
109. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1993) (discussing
petitioner's claims that Bendectin caused birth defects).
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discrimination cases, for example, but there is still resistance. When a
criminal case is based on an eyewitness identification, some judges allow
an expert to testify about the factors that impair the accuracy of an
eyewitness identification, but others do not, often rejecting the expert on
the grounds that he or she did not examine this particular eyewitness but
can only talk about the factors that affect most eyewitness most of the time.
In the case of McCleskey v. Kemp, petitioners presented a study by
David Baldus and his colleagues in which they analyzed data on more than
400 variables in over 1,000 Georgia homicide cases and found that race
was the only variable that could explain the discrimination against
defendants who killed white victims." 0 These defendants were more likely
to be sentenced to death than those who killed black victims, and blacks
who killed whites were the most likely to be sentenced to death."' In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that this sort of aggregate statistical evidence is
inherently "insufficient to support an inference that any of the [individual]
decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose."ll 2
The only evidence that would be sufficient to show that McCleskey's death
sentence violated the Constitution would be evidence that proved either
that the particular jurors in his case were motivated by racial bias or that
the Georgia legislature was motivated by racial bias when it enacted the
death penalty legislation.1 3 This standard created an essentially insuperable
barrier to proof of racial discrimination in capital sentencing. Rachel Moran
argues that this emphasis on disparate intent (for which aggregate social
science data are irrelevant) instead of disparate impact (for which such data
are important) has actually increased under the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts.114
1 believe that the legal system's distrust of statistics is not just a matter
of lack of training in math or empirical methods. A statistically significant
finding implies that other people, perhaps most people, would have
behaved the same way in the same circumstances, suggesting that the
circumstances largely determined the behavior. Much of the law is
grounded in a belief in personal responsibility and free will, whereas the
social scientists work from a much more deterministic set of assumptions,
documenting cultural, sociological, psychological, and especially in
psychology, situational influences on behavior.'
110. See 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
111. Id. at 287.
112. Id. at 297.
113. See id.
114. Rachel F. Moran, What Counts As Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science, and
the Law, 44 LAW SOc'Y REV. 515, 541-43 (2010).
115. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187-96 (1991).
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Of course, the law recognizes that personal responsibility can be a
matter of degree and has developed an elaborate set of definitions of
different levels of responsibility, including malice aforethought and
deliberation, intention, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. But it
ignores, and perhaps must ignore, the social psychological evidence that the
situation plays a far greater role in determining people's behavior than their
personal preferences or dispositions. In fact, situational pressures shape
people's preferences and intentions.l 16 Not only legal actors, but people in
general, are biased towards internal dispositional explanations for other
people's behavior (but not their own),"' a bias so pervasive that it is known
as "the fundamental attribution error."" 8
The social science literature is full of studies demonstrating the
dominance of situational forces over personal dispositions and people's
tenacious belief in personal dispositions. In one famous example, Darley
and Batson studied seminary students who were assigned to give a talk in a
nearby building.1 1 9 They first filled out a measure of the strength and
personal meaning of their religious beliefs. Half of the seminarians were
assigned to talk about the parable of the Good Samaritan, the other half
about seminary jobs. 120 In addition, some were told that they were already
late for the talk, and some were given more time.'21
On the way to the other building, each seminarian passed a man who
was slumped in a doorway, moaning and coughing.122 The question was:
which ones would stop and help him? Those with the strongest religious
beliefs? Those who were thinking about the Good Samaritan? Or those who
had plenty of time? Most people predicted that the most religious students
and the ones who were thinking about the Good Samaritan would be the
most likely to stop and help the man. 12 3 But in fact, these dispositional
factors had little or no effect. What mattered was whether they were in a
hurry: sixty-three percent helped when they had the extra time, but only ten
percent helped when they were in a hurry.124
When the law does take account of situational forces, as in cases of
necessity and duress, they are usually so extreme as to be the stuff of
melodrama: someone asks the bank teller to hand over the money because
116. Id. at 187.
117. Id. at 189.
118. See id. at 130-32.
119. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho ": A Study of Situational
and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100, 102
(1973).
120. See id 102-03.
121. Id. at 103-04.
122. Id. at 104.
123. See id. at 102.
124. See id. at 105.
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another person is holding a gun to her head or breaks into a cabin in the
wilderness because she is freezing to death. The extremity of these
examples suggests the law's failure to recognize the ubiquitous power of
the situation in all aspects of people's daily lives.' 2 5 Even when the law
does make exceptions to attributions of responsibility, these exceptions
usually have to do with aspects of the person (insanity or youth), rather
than aspects of the situation.
The judge's task is to assign blame, and the assumption of free will is
necessary to carrying out the judicial function. But the fact that it is
necessary does not mean that it accurately reflects the blameworthiness of
the individual, and perhaps some awareness of the fundamental attribution
error might temper the punitive nature of American sanctions.
125. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 153
(2003); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and
Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087-88 (2003).
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